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Although Dewey's influence has remained strong
amongst the community of educators, his reputation amongst
philosophers has had a remarkably volatile history. He was
unquestionably the most influential figure in American
philosophy until his death in 1952. Almost immediately after
his death, however, Dewey's writings almost completely disappeared from the American philosophy syllabus. They were
replaced by the analytic philosophers of the logical positivist
tradition, who thought that philosophical problems could be
solved by unraveling puzzles that came from a lack of understanding of proper language use. After several decades,
however, the inadequacies of this view became unavoidably
obvious, and the next generation of analytically trained
philosophers began to find themselves saying things that
sounded remarkably like Dewey. Many analytic philosophers
began to use the word "pragmatist" to describe some aspect
of their positions: Quine, Churchland, Davidson, Feyerabend,
Rorty, Putnam, among many others. Putnam and Rorty, in
particular, have made a serious effort to restudy the original
pragmatist texts, and reinterpret them for use in modern contexts. Not everyone is satisfied with their reinterpretations,
however. Rorty, in particular has been criticized in some detail by Dewey scholars (see especially Saatkamp, 1995). But
Rorty admits that his ideas differ significantly from Dewey's,
because he is trying to revive only those aspects of Dewey's
ideas which are relevant for our times. I will argue, however,
that those aspects of pragmatism which Rorty claims are the
most relevant are actually the most out of date, and vice versa.
The pragmatists were caught between two different philosophical movements and were equally critical of both. On
the one hand, they were reacting against nineteenth century
idealist philosophy, which often got hung up in metaphysical
disputes that had no possibility of being resolved. But on the
other hand, they were equally critical of the positivist's
belief that it was possible to not do metaphysics. Nineteenth
century idealist philosophy is a dead horse in the twenty-first
century, and thus the pragmatist's arguments against it are of
relatively little use today. But analytic philosophy has lived
under the spell of positivism for over a half a century, and
still has not figured out what should go in its place. Rorty
captures this dilemma quite well when he refers to philoso-

Education

and Culture

Spring, 2003 Vol. XIX No. 14

phers like Quine, Sellars and Davidson as "post-analytic
philosophers." The pragmatist alternative to positivism is an
alternative which many of these post-analytic philosophers
have been drifting towards. But as long as we assume that
the pragmatist's contributions to metaphysics and epistemology should be ignored, I believe that we will not be able to
free ourselves from the last reverberations of the positivist
hangover.
In this paper, I will examine some of the modern debates
between pragmatism and so-called "realism," especially those
between Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam. My claim is that
many of these debates are based on misunderstandings of the
pragmatist tradition. If we rely on Dewey's original ideas,
rather than Rorty's reinterpretations of Dewey, these
problems can be radically transformed, and in many cases
dissolved.

The Rorty-Putnam Debate
In the debate between pragmatists and realists, Rorty is
currently seen as the most adamant spokesman for pragmatism. Putnam is seen as slightly to the "epistemological right"
of Rorty, because although he speaks highly of pragmatism,
he considers his position to be less pragmatist, and more
realist, than Rorty's. This balance between pragmatism and
realism is nicely expressed in the title of Putnam's book
"Realism with a Human Face." This title is not just an
historical reference to Czechoslovakian socialism. Putnam's
realism acknowledges that knowledge is always from a
human's, never a God's eye, view. Reality, in other words,
necessarily has a human face, for it makes no sense for us to
talk about a reality which is completely independent of our
human lives and activities. However, Putnam differentiates
himself from Rorty by saying that he, unlike Rorty, believes
that there is a reality which exists independently of our beliefs about it. Putnam argues that we cannot avoid claiming
that some beliefs are warranted (i.e., justified, in some sense),
and others are not, and that this distinction only makes sense
if we accept that reality is somehow independent of our
beliefs about it.
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Putnam's main argument is that Rorty's position contradicts itself, and other concepts that runs so deeply in us that
we cannot possibly think without them (see Putnam, 1990,
pp. 21-24). We cannot say that a warranted belief is merely
what most people believe, because this contradicts the very
idea of warrant itself. To say that a belief is warranted must
mean that one should believe it regardless of whether anyone
else does. Similarly he says that "it is internal to our picture
of reform that whether the outcome of a change is good (a
reform) or bad (its opposite) is logically independent of
whether it seems good or bad" (p. 24). Putnam admits that
the fact that we find it impossible to think without a concept
does not in itself prove that the concept is valid. But Rorty is
apparently saying that we should reject traditional realism
because it is a bad theory, even though the majority of people
currently believe it. And once he makes this move, Putnam
claims that he contradicts himself "what can 'bad' possibly
mean here but 'based on a wrong metaphysical picture'"
(P- 22)?
I think that Putnam is right that there are conceptual
incoherencies in Rorty's arguments, and that some of them
do involve the old logical positivist error of formulating a
metaphysics/epistemology that denies it is a metaphysics/
epistemology. One of the things I will be doing in this paper
is providing more detailed arguments to support Putnam's
claim that "Just saying 'that's a pseudo-issue' is not of itself
therapeutic; it is an aggressive form of the metaphysical disease itself' (ibid., p. 20). But I will also be making two other
claims, one of which supports Putnam against Rorty, and the
other of which criticizes both Putnam and Rorty almost
equally.
The first of these claims is that Rorty is guilty of another
incoherency besides contradiction: he is using arguments
which do not actually support the position he claims they
support. Unlike many of Rorty's Critics, Putnam and I both
believe that most Rorty's more controversial premises are
true. But I will argue that the inferences from those premises
that supposedly lead to Rorty's conclusions are actually
invalid. His main argument for the abandonment of the
questions of epistemology is that a certain answer to these
questions has been shown to be unsatisfactory. But it does
not follow from this fact that therefore epistemology itself
should be abandoned. For if Rorty is only critiquing particular answers to epistemological questions, this has no impact
on the validity of the epistemological enterprise itself.
My second claim is that both Putnam and Rorty are
equally mistaken in claiming that the most important thing
we can learn from pragmatist philosophy is how to cure "the
metaphysical disease." On the contrary, I think that the biggest need in modern analytical philosophy is learning how to
cure the anti-metaphvsical disease, which made its first appearance in the Critique of Pure Reason, and had its most
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extreme form in the logical positivists and in both the early
and late Wittgenstein. Rorty's so-called pragmatism is actually the last gasp of this anti-metaphysical disease, and I
believe that the epistemological and metaphysical writings
of James and Dewey could offer something like a cure for it.
Even the late Wittgenstein believed that the purpose of
philosophizing was to show how to get the fly out of the flybottle which is metaphysical/epistemological paradox, and
Rorty is still struggling to get out of that fly bottle. James and
Dewey believed that we could never get out of the fly bottle
and therefore we must learn how to struggle with the metaphysical/epistemological questions as best we can.
Putnam does recognize that to some degree these philosophical questions are unavoidable, but he sees this as a realist position that makes him less of a pragmatist. The reason
he calls his position "realism with a small r" is that he
accepts that "the enterprises of providing a foundation for
being and knowledge... are enterprises that have disastrously
failed" (Putnam, 1990, p. 19). But he considers it to be realist, and not pragmatist, to say that that 'reconstructive reflection does not lose its value just because the dream of a total
and unique reconstruction of our system of belief is hopelessly Utopian' (ibid., p. 25) and "the illusions that philosophy spins are illusions that belong to the nature of human life
itself (ibid., p. 20). In fact, the original pragmatists would
actually have agreed with the first of these quotes, and disagreed with the second only in a certain sense. They believed
that human life requires us to accept some sort of philosophical 'illusion,' but they did not believe that it was impossible
to escape the particular philosophical positions that have
shaped our thinking so far. They thought that reconstructive
reflection could produce new philosophical assumptions
which would make us more at home in the world, and lead us
into fewer errors, than the ones we have now, even if those
philosophical assumptions were not "the truth" in the realist
sense. They were, in other words, "philosophical revisionists" in the sense that Putnam says he is not (ibid., p. 20).[1]
One is not likely to see this if one uses Rorty as one's
main source for pragmatist insights, for he refers to books
like James' "Essays in Radical Empiricism" and Dewey's
"Experience and Nature," as "pretty useless, to my mind"
(Rorty, 1994, p. 320n). These books contain some of the best
expressions of pragmatist metaphysics and epistemology, and
ignoring them is to lose an essential part of the pragmatist
worldview. When we take a close look at Rorty's critiques of
the epistemological enterprise, we can see that he simply
ignores pragmatist epistemology, and thus closes off what is
perhaps the most fruitful new perspective on the subject. This
is why he assumes that once he has disposed of the prepragmatist answers to the metaphysical questions, he has
disposed of the questions themselves. This is also why he is
unable to see that he himself is still hanging on to highly
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questionable epistemological assumptions, which he himself
cannot question because he refuses to explicitly think about
epistemology.

On Confusing the Question with the Answer
Reading Rorty often gives a sense that philosophy is an
enterprise which has come to the end of its tether, whose only
task left is to find a way of committing suicide in the most
dignified manner possible. We must refrain from argument,
he says, and content ourselves with only having conversations. We must avoid trying to answer any of the questions
that have concerned philosophers, or even trying to prove
that they cannot be answered. And we must refrain from trying to change our fundamental beliefs about reality, or from
searching for justifications for keeping them. I think, however, that most of this doom and gloom comes from a single
mistake: Rorty's claim that doing epistemology is not asking
a kind of question, but giving a kind of answer, and/or claiming that it is possible for those answers to be apodicticly
certain. To some degree, Rorty is aware that he is doing this,
which is why it is hard to tell exactly what he is saying we
should stop doing, and why we should stop doing it. He says
that no one would deny that we can always ask Sellars' question "how things in the broadest possible sense of the term
hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term." He
calls this philosophy, and contrasts it with Philosophy (with
a capital "P"). When he talks about the differences between
these two, however, it looks like he is defining Capital-P
Philosophy not by the questions it asks, but by the answers it
gives. And if he is only critiquing particular answers to epistemological questions, this has no impact on the validity of
the epistemological enterprise itself.
For example, Rorty says that one of the characteristics
of Philosophy is the hope that we can "believe more truths or
do more good or be more rational by knowing more about
Truth or Goodness or Rationality" (Rorty, 1982, p. xvi). He
claims that even Anti-Platonists like Hobbes and the logical
positivists practiced Philosophy in this sense, because they
still believed that "the assemblage of true statements should
be thought of as divided into a lower and an upper division,
the division between (in Plato's terms) mere opinion and genuine knowledge" (ibid.). He calls all thought that presupposes
the belief that there is such a division "epistemology," and
says that once we have given up the possibility of finding
something that all true sentences have in common, we have
changed the subject, and are no longer doing epistemology.
Rorty is correct when he says that most epistemologists
have agreed on this point, even when they have disagreed
about everything else. But because I don't agree with this
point myself, this sentence sounds to me like "You are not
really an astronomer if you are not trying to find out what
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turns the crystal spheres." I believe that there is a continuum,
not a line, between this lower and upper division, and that
true statements are related to each other by family resemblance, not by all possessing a single set of essential properties. I could be wrong about either or both of these points, but
I am clearly making an epistemological claim when I say
them, and anyone who has a conversation with me about this
subject will be making other epistemological claims. If I try
to articulate the various activities and qualities that various
true statements have (for example, if I say that true statements are always useful) what I am doing is epistemology. If
I say that the sole essential property of true statements is that
they are all useful, and therefore demand that no more be
said about the subject, I am also doing epistemology.
This last position is ironically more essentialist than the
positions of those of us who want to continue talking about
epistemology, for it asserts that all true statements have this
one property of usefulness and no other. If we assume that
true statements are related by family resemblance, rather than
by a set of essential properties, then the epistemologist's task
would be to create a list of characteristics that are often shared
by many true statements, and then try to understand which
ones are likely to cluster together, and which ones are mutually exclusive. This assumption would not require us to give
up talking about truth altogether. The fact that Aristotle did
not believe that there is a single essence that all good things
have in common did not stop him from writing ethics. For
that matter, it is now widely believed that the categories that
we use to classify plants and animals into species are family
resemblances, yet no one who believes this thinks that we
should therefore refrain from doing botany and zoology (see
Dupre, 1993 and Lakoff, 1987). [2]
When we look at what Rorty says about the relationship
between epistemology and empirical psychology in 'Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,' we can see that he makes similar mistakes in most of his arguments. In the chapter titled
"Epistemology and Empirical Psychology" (Rorty, 1979,
pp. 213-256), Rorty says that naturalized epistemology cannot "aid in maintaining the image of philosophy as a discipline which stands apart from empirical inquiry" (p. 220).
But why should it, and why should this be a problem for epistemology so serious that it would require us to abandon it
altogether? I think Rorty sees the problem as being that the
sciences do have specialized domains and that if philosophy
doesn't have one it must not be a legitimate enterprise (hence
his frequent use of the pejorative "dilettante" to describe the
condition of the modern philosopher). But the creation of
cognitive science shows that at least some scientists have now
learned that all disciplines are separated from each other only
by differences in degree. Yet no one says we should stop doing linguistics or neuroscience because neither one will be
able to fully understand language without consulting the other.
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If we accept (as I think Rorty does) that the exact divisions
between all scientific specialties are decided by social convention rather than by where nature has placed carvable joints,
why is there any problem with the fact that the specialized
borders of philosophy are drawn vertically (by levels of
abstraction) rather than horizontally (by subject matter)? This
is basically the point that Haack makes when she says that
"giving up the idea that philosophy is distinguished by its a
priori character encourages a picture of philosophy as continuous with science. . .but this does not oblige one to deny
that there is a difference in degree between science and
philosophy" (Haack, 1993, p. 188). [3]
In another section of Rorty 1979 entitled 'Epistemological Behaviorism,' Rorty claims that "Epistemological behaviorism. . . has nothing to do with Watson or with Ryle"
(p. 176). The reason is that "We can take the Sellars-Quine
attitude towards knowledge while cheerfully 'countenancing'
raw feels, a priori concepts, innate ideas, sense data, propositions, and anything else which a causal explanation of
human behavior might find it helpful to postulate" (p. 177).
It is difficult to square Rorty's acceptance of "lush metaphysical landscapes" (ibid.) with his continual assertions that he
wants there to be no alternative to epistemology, only a change
of subject. The above list contains essentially every theoretical term discussed in the history of epistemology. What then
does Rorty mean when he says that we should not do epistemology? "Behaviorism in epistemology is a matter not of
metaphysical parsimony, but whether authority can attach to
assertions by virtue of relations of 'acquaintance'..." (ibid.).
Rorty claims, in other words, that all epistemologies must
accept that knowledge has foundations, or they are not worthy of the name. But although this is certainly a popular epistemological position, it is not the only possible position on
this issue. No one would claim that to say dinosaurs are reptiles is doing paleontology, but to say they are birds is not to
do paleontology. Two different answers to the same question
are talking about the same subject, even (perhaps especially)
if they say different things about that subject.

Rorty's Reactionary Positivism
Rorty is not merely changing the subject the way he
would be if he interrupted an epistemological discussion by
saying "how about those Niners!!" He is not content to simply stop talking about epistemology, he wants to assert that
there is something wrong about continuing to do so, and something right about stopping. And any such assertion contains
(at least dimly) some presuppositions about this activity that
should be stopped, or it would make no sense. Rorty almost
acknowledges this when he describes what he now does by
saying things like "hermeneutics is always parasitic upon the
possibility (and perhaps upon the actuality) of epistemology"
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(Rorty, 1979, p. 366) and "edifying philosophers have to decry the very notion of having a view, while avoiding having a
view about having views" (ibid., p. 371) After the second
quote, Rorty adds "this is an awkward, but not impossible
position." But impossible is precisely the right word for this
position, for it contains essentially the same contradiction as
the Logical Positivist claim that "all non-empirical, nontautologous statements are meaningless, except for this one."
Because there are so many contradictions in Rorty's
attempt to shut down epistemology, I think we ought to take
him at his word the one time he denies allegiance to metaphysical parsimony, and ignore the numerous times he endorses it. He should then be willing to add a few caveats about
fallibilism to the beginning of "Experience and Nature," and
then accept it (and other works of epistemology) as manifestations of a valid enterprise (i.e., worth criticizing, rather than
merely dismissing with a change of subject). To some degree, my recommendation is the mirror image of Rorty's
analysis of Dewey in his "Dewey between Hegel and Darwin." The pragmatists were, as Rorty points out in this essay,
highly ambivalent about the epistemological enterprise.
James and Dewey, alas, never made up their minds whether
they wanted just to forget about epistemology or whether they
wanted to devise a new improved epistemology of their own.
In my view they should have opted for forgetting, (pp. 59-60)
What I am claiming is that Rorty has made a similar
equivocation, and that in my view he should opt for devising
a new improved epistemology. Rorty is already making epistemological assumptions when he asserts that epistemological questions have no answers, or that it is possible to change
the subject when epistemological questions come up, or that
the only possible answer to "what is truth" is "whatever is set
by social practices." His attempt to be operationalist and positivistic about epistemology fails for the same basic reason
that Skinner's behaviorism and Carnap's positivism fails: we
cannot assume that we are not making theoretical assumptions simply because we have stopped deliberately theorizing. In Rorty 1982, he remarks that many people think of
pragmatism as being just a namby-pamby sort of positivism.
What I am arguing is that to some degree, Rorty's pragmatism really is just a namby-pamby sort of positivism. Part of
what makes it namby-pamby is that it is not supported by the
dogmatic scientism of the positivists. This makes Rorty far
more tolerant of alternative world-views than the positivists
ever were, which is a virtue I admire. But without the foundation of sense data that made positivism a form of realism,
Rorty's anti-metaphysical bias collapses into a kind of
subjective idealism.
In fact, if I were to come up with a single phrase to
describe Rorty's epistemology, I would call it "Idealism in
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denial." This is most obvious when he says things like this:
Epistemological Behaviorism. . . can best be seen as a
species of holism-but one that requires no idealist metaphysical underpinnings. (Rorty, 1979, p. 174)
To retain the idealist's holism while junking their metaphysics, all we need to do is to renounce the ambition of
transcendence. (Rorty, 1993, p. 190)
Unfortunately, once we have accepted holism, transcendence is no longer an ambition, it is a duty and a curse.
Holism accepts that all entities from gods to physical objects
presuppose a reference to transcendent assumptions, even if
those assumptions are not universal and apodictic. We can't
escape this by saying that if we had opinions on this subject
we would be idealists, and then coyly add that of course we
don't have such opinions. We may, however, be able to
escape idealism if we can formulate an alternative to it, and
this is what Dewey and James were trying to do in 'Experience and Nature' and 'Essays in Radical Empiricism' respectively. Despite what Rorty and the positivists believe, the only
cure for epistemology is more epistemology.

Pragmatism and Epistemology
How then should we do epistemology from a pragmatist
perspective? Part of the answer, I believe must be found by
philosophizing about philosophy itself. This is not just a matter
of justifying our profession to our peers in order to increase
respect and grants. The relationship between fact and theory,
the concrete and the abstract, is one of the central questions
of epistemology. Our philosophy of knowledge is certainly
incomplete if we don't understand the relationship between
philosophy, (which—arguably—tries to be the most abstract
discipline of all), and other more concrete branches of knowledge. And I believe that a genuinely pragmatist view of philosophy will ultimately grant a measure of epistemic virtue
to the philosophy that preceded it, just as it grants epistemic
virtue to any system of thought that serves a human need.
Because we must philosophize, for better or worse, philosophers should give up trying to make fundamental changes
in what they have been doing. They must instead try to get a
better understanding of what they have been doing all along,
so they can develop realistic criteria for distinguishing good
philosophy from bad. Kant set very ambitious goals for himself, and in terms of those goals he was a failure. And yet (I
can't help saying this with a Yiddish accent) "We aH should
be such failures." Kant clearly succeeded at something, and
was more successful at it than any undergraduate term paper
or Ph.D. thesis written on the same topics. And yet we as
philosophers do not have any way of expressing what it was
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that Kant succeeded in doing. This is why we continue to
flagellate ourselves, thinking the way to self-improvement is
to continue to try to do less. Rorty's attempted dismissal of
epistemology is, I hope, the last gasp of this futile and selfdestructive strategy, which was begun by Kant's Critiques
and carried even further by the logical positivists.
This does not mean that all metaphysical and epistemological writings are of equal value. There is no denying that
many of the metaphysical excesses of certain debates in contemporary analytic philosophy are every bit as bad as those
of nineteenth century philosophy. Putnam gives an example
of such a debate between Quine, Lewis, and Kripke on
p. 26-27 of Putnam 1990. I think that Putnam is correct in
claiming that the best way of dealing with these kinds of
excesses is to perform something like what James called cashvalue analysis. This is essentially what Putnam is doing when
he considers whether there are any other significant implications to these claims, and when he decides that there are not,
concludes that "No one, not even God {can answer such a
question}... and not because there is something He doesn't
know" (ibid.). But Dewey and James never asserted that all
metaphysical claims lack cash value. On the contrary, they
believed that all discourse presupposes some kind of metaphysical claims, and that this was what made it possible for
us to think rationally at all.
How then does one identify philosophical claims which
have cash value? No pragmatist would claim that there was a
single necessary and sufficient definition which could answer
that question. The bulk of my answer will be two very specific examples, one from Dewey's work and one from modern philosophy, which will hopefully make these principles
clear. Before I become more specific, I must say something
about the abstractions that those examples are meant to exemplify. For the pragmatist view of the relationship between
concreta and abstracta is very different from the traditional
realist view.

The Pragmatist View of the Relationship
Between Knowledge and Human Activity
Pragmatists claims that when language is used in human
inquiry, the goal of the language user is to facilitate the
achievement of the goals of other human activities. It does
this by making abstract commitments about the entities
encountered while performing those other activities. Because
these commitments are abstract extrapolations from what is
experienced, they make it possible for the inquirer to change
that activity in radical and productive ways, sometimes so
radically that it becomes necessary to give the changed
activity a whole new name. This is probably why human
beings are so much better at learning than any other animal.
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Language enables us to take what we have learned through
the experience of performing one kind of activity, and apply
it to a completely different activity. It is the abstract nature of
language which enables us to make use of one kind of experience in a variety of different contexts.
However, the epistemic merit of these various abstractions is not determined by mere agreement within the community of language users. If one set of epistemological commitments leads its believers into fewer and/or less dangerous
errors than some other set, the former has greater epistemic
merit. And this epistemic merit is an independent fact, which
holds even if no one in the community of language users is
aware of it. There are many reason why a community might
decide to cling to a bad theory—stubbornness, fear, social
prejudice against those who advance alternatives. But if one
theory leads its believers into more serious errors than
another possible competitor, that theory is epistemically
inferior to its competitor even if the community remains in
denial about these errors. This is why Rorty is wrong when
he says that the only criterion by which we can evaluate our
theories is agreement within the community. Note, however,
that we do not have to posit a world that is independent of
human activities in order to make this claim. We need only
posit that there are human activities other than language, and
that it is possible for language to prescribe courses of action
which cause those activities to be (in varying degrees) either
successful or unsuccessful on their own terms. The difference between 1) an epistemology which enables a practitioner to obtain the goals of that practice and 2) an epistemology which routinely leads a practitioner into errors, is a real
and measurable cash value difference between the two epistemologies. And this difference does not disappear simply
because a community has failed to notice it.
Rorty's inability to make the distinction between genuine cash value and community consensus is one more
example of his affinity with positivism and estrangement from
traditional pragmatism. Rorty admits that his pragmatism is
one that "got a new lease on life by u n d e r g o i n g
linguistification" (Saatkamp, 1995, p. 70). This exclusive
focus on language makes it impossible for Rorty to take seriously any of Dewey's theories about the importance of activity and experience. This is why Rorty naturally tends to see
language as a self-contained entity, with no other criterion
for evaluation other than the agreement of the community in
which the language is spoken. For Rorty, one of the consequences of pragmatism is that there is no world that exists
outside of our language. (And because Rorty believes that all
thought is linguistic, this also means that there is no world
that exists outside of our thought.) This is what he means
when he refers to a "world well lost" in the title of chapter 2
in Rorty 1982. This is why Rorty concludes that if there is a
consensus that our language is accurate, it must be accurate.
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because supposedly there is no world outside of our language
which the language is required to describe.
Putnam, as I mentioned earlier, refuses to accept this
position because he believes (I think correctly) that it is selfcontradictory. He therefore claims that we have no choice
but to accept some form of realism. However, the third alternative I describe above is pragmatist, rather than realist, and
can be extrapolated from one of Putnam's more famous aphorisms. 'The mind and the world jointly make up the mind and
the world' (Putnam, 1981, p. xi).
Putnam is here proposing a concept of "world" which
may seem counter intuitive at first, but there is justification
for this usage in ordinary language (as well as in the writings
of both Heidegger and Dewey). The word "World" does not
always refer to something that is completely mind independent. Every conscious organism has an interactive, symbiotic relationship with certain parts of its environment, which
arises because of the goals and activities of that organism.
When we speak of "the world of commerce" or "the world of
football" we are not talking about some particular acreage of
real estate. We are talking about a network of activities which
establishes relationships amongst people, places, and things.
If we take Putnam to mean "world" in this sense, we could
interpret his slogan as implying the following three statements.
1) These worlds obviously do not exist independently of the
minds of the people who plan business deals and football
strategies. 2) Yet these worlds are also not completely mind
dependent—if people were only thinking about football, and
not playing it on real football fields, the world of football as
we know it would not exist. 3) I think Putnam would also
accept that there is no thought without embodied activity in
some sort of world (in agreement with Dewey and Heidegger,
and in contradistinction to someone like Descartes). In other
words, it would not be possible to think about football, or
anything else, unless we had a world in which football and
other activities could be performed. If we put all three of these
claims together, we end up with the conclusion that the mind
and the world jointly make up the mind and the world.
What Putnam might not accept, and what Rorty and I do
accept, is that these kinds of worlds are the only kinds of
worlds that exist. There is no reason to believe that there is
such a thing as a world-in-itself, independent of all of the
thoughts, beliefs and activities of conscious beings. To be a
pragmatist means to live and think with the metaphysical assumption that such a world does not exist, and that it is a
world well lost. Those who refuse to accept this kind of pragmatism call themselves realists, but there is nothing realistic
about their position if in fact the world-in-itself does not exist. Searle defends this kind of "realism" by distinguishing
socially constructed reality (which for him includes the worlds
described by biology, economics, and every other science
except physics) from the world in itself (which is described
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by physics). I believe, and I imagine that Rorty agrees with
me, that this distinction is a completely unjustified privileging of the activities of physicists over the activities of everyone else. I think Putnam would have almost as much problem with Searle's "realism" as Rorty and I would, but would
want to claim that there is still some sort of world which is
independent of human activity, even if the physicists are not
the people who know what it is. But I think the only reason
Putnam still clings to something like a "realist" world is that
he cannot accept Rorty's claim that consensus among
language users is the only thing that determines the nature of
their world. Neither Rorty nor Putnam have considered the
possibility that the world could be constituted by our activities, and still be distinct from what our language says about
it, because language is not the only human activity.
Barry Allen makes a similar criticism of Rorty when he
accuses Rorty of having a propositional and discursive bias
in his critique of epistemology. But despite Allen's undeniable comitment to pragmatism, there is an unnecessary
acceptance of traditional realism in his claim that ". . . brute
causality limits what we can make and do in ways which
unfortunately can have surprisingly little to do with 'agreements within a community about the consequences of a certain event'" (Brandom, 2000, p. 230). To some degree, the
above paragraphs are a restatement of Allen's point, but without the assumption of a brute causality impinging onto
human experience from the so-called real word. If the success and failure of non-verbal human activities is independent of our beliefs about that success, there is no need to
posit a non-human "brute causality" to account for errors made
by the linguistic community.

Dewey and Philosophical Questions
with "Cash Value"
Pragmatism claims that all human activity presupposes
some kind of abstract theorizing, and abstract theorizing gets
all of its meaning from it's ability to guide and effect some
other human activity. Consequently, if you want to do philosophy which has genuine cash value, you should find a
human activity and analyze the philosophical presuppositions
that govern it. Such an analysis can often reveal that these
presuppositions cause errors, and suggest the possibility of
other philosophical assumptions which might lead to fewer
errors.
Are there any concrete examples of human activities that
have benefited from philosophical reflection or suffered because of the lack of it? I will end this paper by giving one
example of each. First, contemporary cognitive science arose
because psychologists discovered that a bad philosophical
theory had caused stagnation and dogmatism in their
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discipline. This is why philosophers are now an active part of
the cognitive science community. Second, this kind of analysis is precisely what Dewey himself did throughout his long
career. Almost all of his "non-philosophical" writings can be
seen as a "cashing out" of his abstract concepts so that they
could be applied to some concrete situations. And his analysis had an undeniable impact on the practitioners of many
different disciplines. One of the most dramatic and influential examples of this was when Dewey applied his pragmatist
theory of knowledge to the theory of education.

Philosophy and Cognitive Science
When we look at contemporary cognitive science, there
is a strong sense that those scientists who study the mind
have decided that there is a need for philosophy to supplement their work, and that contemporary philosophers are helping to meet that need. This awareness has arisen because psychologists experienced almost a half-century of behaviorist
operationalism, and were acutely aware of the many problems that arise when one tries not to theorize. They had learned
from bitter experience the inadequacies of the maxim "take
care of the facts, and the theories will take care of themselves."
They now realized that high level theorizing was a different
skill from being able to design a good laboratory experiment,
and that both skills were necessary to understanding their
subject matter. Living through the history of mid-twentieth
century philosophy of mind may incline us to share Rorty's
sense that epistemological questions cannot be answered and/
or that what answers you choose make no pragmatic difference. But when we see how the epistemological presuppositions of behaviorism misguided psychology, we can see that
the epistemology you choose can make a great deal of difference indeed. We can also see that an epistemology that claims
it is not an epistemology is a bad choice for purely pragmatic
reasons. Laboratory psychologists have spent the last few
decades cleaning up the wreckage left by the Skinnerian attempts to be operationalist, and what they need now is a
metatheory about how to theorize, not reiterations of the old
puritanical demands to refrain from theorizing. (For concrete
examples of how operationalism led psychology into errors,
crisis, and finally into "The Cognitive Revolution," see Baars,
1986).
In the days of behaviorism and positivism, the goal of
philosophers was to make philosophy a science, or at least as
much like a science as possible. In contrast, at least some
analytical philosophers in today's cognitive science community have a sense that what they are doing is different from
science and that this difference contributes to science's
growth. I see several reasons for this change, mostly stemming from the discovery that the kind of analysis that had
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been applied to ordinary language could be done every bit as
effectively on scientific language. This discovery stopped
philosophy from dealing with the same examples and problems over and over again, and it gave philosophy the right to
say new and profound things, because science is supposed to
contradict common sense. No one would ever attempt to dismiss the expanding universe theory by saying "that is not
what we mean by space." The Churchland's critique of folk
psychology was especially revolutionary in this way; thanks
to their arguments, common sense became something to be
explained away, rather than the court of last appeal. This is
essentially the same attitude that Heidegger has towards
durchschnittlich (the average everyday), and which Dewey
has to the prereflective activities that constitute human experience. Heidegger believes that fundamental ontology will
provide the explanatory context that will transform everyday
experience. Dewey and the Churchlands believe that it is science (for the Churchlands, neuroscience) that will produce
this transformation. But despite the numerous differences
amongst their philosophies, the Churchlands, Dewey,and
Heidegger all agree that it is essential for philosophers to come
up with new theories about the nature of mind and the self,
and to abandon the cautious modesty that prompted so many
people to think of analytic philosophy as trivial.
Quine realized (although he did not always stress it) that
his talk about the need to naturalize epistemology also
implied a need to epistemologize the natural sciences of mind.
Although the philosopher has lost the right to prescribe a priori
structures to the sciences, the scientist has also lost the right
to think (as Skinner did) that it was possible to rely on a neutral observation language and forget about philosophical
speculations. This was an essential implication of Quine's
claim that belief in objects was every bit as theoretical as
belief in the gods of Homer. Philosophy and science are now
adrift in the same boat, the philosopher without his old transcendental foundations, and the scientist without his empirical foundations. When we keep all of this in mind, it seems
that Rorty's Puritanism about philosophical abstraction is a
quaint holdover from the days of the logical positivists, and
inconsistent with his pragmatism. Because the logical positivists believed that each sentence was atomistic and needed
no help from any other sentence, they could also believe that
it was possible to throw away sentences above a certain level
of abstraction and leave the concrete observation sentences
intact. Pragmatism, however, (in the words of Susan Haack)
"maintains that the notion of concrete truth depends on the
notion of abstract truth, and cannot stand alone" (Haack, 1993,
p. 202). It is an inevitable corollary of Rorty's QuineanSellarsian holism that every sentence gets its meaning from
the other sentences that appear with it in a context of discourse. The web of belief is not a mosaic with independent
parts, so to understand how we think we must also under-

stand the patterns that govern how the web is woven, and the
meta-patterns that interrelate those patterns. Consequently,
to refrain from philosophizing is not an option, those who do
not consciously philosophize are doomed to presupposing a
philosophy. As Sellars said "We may philosophize for good
or ill, but we must philosophize" (Sellars, 1975, p. 296).

Dewey's Influence on Educational Theory
Those of us who admire Dewey frequently wonder how
such a profound and influential thinker could have disappeared
so completely from the American philosophy curriculum. It
is thus heartening to discover that there are places in American academia where Dewey's influence never faded. The readers of this journal are well aware of the fact that Dewey's
"Democracy and Education" is still widely read in graduate
schools of education. And the people who read it are not academic philosophers who are interested in fined honed metaphysical logic chopping for its own sake. They are people
who want guidance on how to become good teachers and
administrators, and they read this book because they find it
helps them become better at the activity called teaching.
And yet almost every chapter is filled with references to
thinkers like Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, or Hume, and to the
grand metaphysical questions they struggled with. The main
theme of the book is that this philosophical tradition has made
fundamental errors in its conception of what knowledge is,
which, naturally enough, interfere with a teacher's ability to
impart knowledge to students. From Descartes, teachers
inherited the idea that it was possible for the mind to learn
without involving the body. From Hume, teachers inherited
the idea that knowledge consisted of discrete bits of information, and that learning consisted of stuffing those bits of
information into the head. Dewey's alternative epistemology
helps teachers to avoid those (and many other) errors,
because it explains why they are errors. The fact that students today do laboratory work, go on field trips, and do
numerous other activities involving embodied experience, is
almost entirely due to the influence of Dewey's epistemology on contemporary educators.
In other words, Democracy and Education concerns itself with the sorts of issues that Rorty criticizes academics
for being too concerned with in his recent Achieving our
Country. In Democracy and Education, Dewey does not "put
a moratorium on theory" or "try to kick {the} the philosophy
habit" (Rorty, 1998, p. 91). On the contrary, he provides
detailed critiques of, and alternatives to, traditional epistemological theories such as the correspondence theory of truth.
(Which Rorty claims a good pragmatist should simply
ignore, ibid., p. 97). And yet Democracy and Education has
managed to have exactly the sort of impact which Rorty has
said such a book could never have. It has helped
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non-philosophers become more skillful and effective in their
daily activities, and it does so by talking about the implications of those epistemological assumptions which Rorty
claims have no significant impact on real life. For how could
anyone who teaches ignore the importance of the question
"what is knowledge?"
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Footnotes
1 In his reply to Putnam, (Rorty, 1993) Rorty also asserts
that he is not a philosophical revisionist either, despite
Putnam's claim that this is what differentiates their positions.
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2 Perhaps Haack is acknowledging this fact when she says
that Rorty's attacks on epistemology "would undermine not
only epistemology, not only 'systematic' philosophy, but
inquiry generally" (Haack, 1993, pp. 182-3). Haack, however, appears to be presenting this fact as a sort of reductio ad
absurdum, and I do not know whether I agree with her about
this. Lakoff and Dupre do not see these facts about language
and biology to be cause for alarm, only for reform. My goal
here is only to show that Rorty cannot consistently demand
that epistemologists should change the subject when all other
subjects are equally vulnerable to these criticisms.
3 The removed section indicated by dots in the above quote
adds the phrase "as part of S C I E N C E " and the word
"science" is italicized the first time it appears in the original
quote. The italicized and the capitalized versions of "science"
in the quote are technical terms in Haack's epistemology. She
uses " 'science ' [in italics] for the disciplines ordinarily called
'science' and SCIENCE for the broader usage, referring to
"our empirical beliefs generally" (Haack, 1993, p. 123). Haack
uses this distinction not only to make the point quoted above,
but to criticize Quine for assuming that all SCIENCE must
be science. (A criticism that applies equally accurately to
Rorty.) Rorty obviously couldn't have dealt with Haack's 1993
Evidence and Inquiry in any of his works cited here, all of
which were written several years earlier. But the fact that
Haack has now created a detailed and precise nonfoundationalist, non-a priori, epistemology is pretty good
evidence (even for someone who doesn't agree with her
theories) that there are still important things to be said about
epistemology in an aposteriorist philosophy.

